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Leidschrift, jaargang 27, nummer 2, september 2012 
In a book that commemorates the bicentennial of the American 
constitution, historian Michael Kammen argues that the history of the 
document establishing the American political system is characterized by 
fierce debates and quarrels.1 In the years between 1787, when the text was 
written, and 1986, when Kammen’s study was published, a consensus about 
the meaning of the political document was usually absent. Kammen’s 
depiction of two centuries of constitutional disagreements fits into a more 
general appraisal of the American political tradition that disposes of pieties 
surrounding the constitution often expressed by citizens and scholars alike. 
Far from being an elegantly balanced system of checks and balances that 
offers all political players their fair share, the constitution helped bring 
about a democracy that, institutionally and otherwise, is a veritable struggle 
for survival. It forces its participants to remain ever vigilant and organized, 
prepared to defend their position and perspective, aware that the moment 
they fail to fight for their rights and interests, others will use the opportunity 
to their own advantage. As a result, participants are forced to make sure that 
their voices are heard in government circles: efforts to gain access to 
government officials and politicians become an inherent part of the system. 
Lobbying to gain that access is turned into a political necessity. 
 Covering moments and movements in American political history 
ranging from the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party in the 1960s to 
evangelicals in the Reagan era and African-American New Yorkers 
concerned about the burial site of their ancestors in the 1990s, the following 
essays show how Americans struggled to get their convictions and interests 
registered and realized by organizing and expressing their perspective in the 
public domain of politics and seeking out politicians for support. They 
show how various participants in American democracy added to the 
remarkable phenomenon that French visitor Alexis de Tocqueville noted 
when traveling in the United States in the 1830s: the abundant presence of 
associations lobbying to influence public opinion and government 
decisions.2 
                                                     
1 M. Kammen, A Machine that Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture 
(New York 1986). 
2 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835; 1840) trans. by G. Bevan (London 
and New York 2003). 




 In its most crude and materialist form, however, this self-help 
tradition in American democracy has a bad reputation. It is usually 
described in terms of the material interests groups and their lobbyists 
scheming to use the public domain for private purposes. Lobbying for 
access to government circles in this sense is what undermines democracy. 
The recent 2010 Supreme Court decision in the Citizens United case, in 
which a majority of the judges allowed private companies and labor unions 
(with very few restrictions) to spend freely on political campaigns, only 
reinforced the impression, common among many commentators of the 
American political scene, that money and material interest groups secretly 
influencing officials and politicians have hijacked American democracy and 
should serve as a warning for the dangers besetting democracy more 
generally. It can come as no surprise that those citizens who try to improve 
the quality of American politics aim to regulate and contain the behavior of 
lobbyists in particular. 
 As the essays in this volume of Leidschrift indicate, these efforts raise 
important issues. If American democracy entails an incessant struggle to be 
taken notice of, lobbying and its history transcend and complicate the story 
of private companies dictating government policies and robber barons 
buying political influence during election time. If lobbies are like the 
factions that James Madison depicts in his ‘Federalist No. 10’ (his most 
famous contribution to the debate about the American constitution that he 
helped write), that is to say a necessary evil without which liberty cannot 
exist, lobbying takes on a different hue.3 Although the need to distinguish 
between types of lobbies and degrees of their activities’ openness remains 
relevant, what is one to make of lobbying when it no longer contradicts 
democracy but is at the heart of it? 
 
Defined as the often secret, unwarranted influence exerted on political 
power brokers and government officials by agents representing specific 
material interest groups, lobbying activities are an at once oddly 
straightforward and broad phenomenon. According to this definition, 
which emphasizes the negative features involved in lobbying, it privileges a 
few at the cost of the many. Lobbyists representing private interests 
undermine the public good; their illicit access to people in power thwarts 
the democratic process. As its historians and opponents would argue, this 
                                                     
3 J. Madison, ‘The Federalist No. 10’ (1787) in: J. Madison, Writings (New York 
1999). 




lobbying for private material gain has a long history, as old as American 
politics itself. Lobbies and their opponents quarreled from the moment 
George Washington began governing the country under the new 
constitution in 1789. One of the complaints that Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison lodged against the policies of Washington’s Treasury 
Secretary Alexander Hamilton in the 1790s was exactly that he only took the 
financial interests of New York City’s burgeoning bankers and their 
supporters to heart. 4  Andrew Jackson, president from 1829 until 1837, 
continued Jefferson’s crusade against what he deemed Wall Street’s 
moneyed interests, fueling a populist tradition that in its efforts to uphold 
the myth that American democracy was characterized by ‘equal rights for all 
and privileges for none’ continually saw and attacked special interest groups 
corrupting the ideal.5  
At the end of the twentieth century, Washington Post journalist William 
Greider relied on this populist complaint in his Secrets of the Temple, in which 
he portrayed Jackson-like how Wall Street was running the Federal Reserve 
system and the United States’ economy, and in his Who Will Tell the People, a 
lament about the ways in which private companies abuse the political 
procedures in Congress for their own purposes.6 As Greider’s second book 
shows, even after legislative proposals had passed Congress and been 
turned into laws, corporate interests managed to block or dramatically 
undercut the practical implementation of these legislative efforts by making 
sure that the rules were rewritten to their own advantage in the regulatory 
agencies overlooking the process. The very industrial moguls often idealized 
as key players in American economic developments are also often attacked 
as robber barons because of the undue influence they exert(ed) over the 
political process in the United States. While idolized as role models, the 
Rockefellers, Morgans and Adelmans of their time are also criticized for 
corrupting politics due to the anti-democratic, influence-buying practices 
                                                     
4 S. Elkins and E. McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-
1800 (New York and Oxford) particularly chapter II, ‘Finance and Ideology’, 77-
131.  
5 Herbert Croly uses the phrase in his The Promise of American Life (1909; Boston 
1989) 150. 
6 W. Greider, Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country (New York 
1987) and Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American Democracy (New York and 
London 1992).  




and organizations they use(d) to make sure their needs are heeded.7 Their 
lobbying efforts are seen as a threat, undermining the quality of American 
democracy. 
 A substantive part of American political history accordingly consists 
of the rather unsuccessful efforts to limit and suppress this type of lobbying 
or channel it to such an extent that it no longer endangers democratic 
procedures. The first truly professional political party system established in 
the 1820s by politicians such as Martin van Buren (who created the current 
Democratic Party) and many of Tocqueville’s associations for instance 
aimed to regulate and control interest group politics, but hardly did so. Far 
from ending the access of special interests and their agents to government 
officials and politicians, they continued it; instead of solving the problem of 
unwarranted lobbying efforts, the political parties and associations became 
part of it. They helped divide the country into interest groups that defended 
their often rather material interests by trying to exert undue political 
influence. By fueling the proliferation of interest groups they made lobbying 
only slightly more democratic: hardly mitigating its worst aspects and far 
from abolishing it, they opened up lobbying to many more groups than in 
Hamilton’s days. Even though many groups became involved in lobbying 
efforts, it remained clear that a few Americans were always able to ‘buy’ 
more easy access to power brokers than others. 
 Occasionally, opponents of lobbying succeeded in scoring a few 
important but usually temporary victories. The influence of moneyed 
interests on elections has always been deemed the most blatant abuse of the 
political system linked to lobbying efforts. Even before the Watergate 
scandal revealed how President Richard Nixon had relied on unlimited 
private donations for his 1972 reelection campaign, the need to regulate 
political campaign financing and limit the privileged access of special 
interest groups to the White House and Congress was obvious to many. 
Responding to worries about the influence of private interests on politics in 
the decades after the Civil War and, more particularly the election of 1904, 
President Theodore Roosevelt suggested limiting corporate contributions to 
the political process in 1905, beginning a movement that in its current-day 
reform efforts was reignited in 1971, when Congress adopted the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA). The act tried to limit the flow of often 
private money into for instance presidential and Congressional election 
                                                     
7  Ken Adelman and his family are among the current-day financial backers of 
Republican candidates and causes. 




campaigns and set aside public money to run the presidential election 
process. Before the law went into effect in 1972, Nixon used the 
opportunity to collect millions of private donations (often in cash) to 
enhance his chances of reelection. A recent Washington Post article about the 
1972 events describes how  
 
money poured into Richard Nixon’s reelection campaign from all 
corners; Six-figure checks flown by corporate jets from Texas; 
bundles of payments handed over at an Illinois game preserve; a 
battered brown attaché case stuffed with $ 200.000 in cash from a 
New Jersey investor, hoping to fend off a fraud investigation. 
  
As the article continues: 
 
During four pivotal weeks in spring 1972, the president brought in as 
much as $ 20 million – about $110 million in today’s dollars – much 
of it in the form of illegal corporate donations and all of it raised to 
avoid disclosure rules that went into effect in that April.8 
 
When all this became public, Congress came up with new, stricter rules in 
1974, and established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer 
the election process. Congress passed a series of rules stipulating how much 
money individuals could contribute to election campaigns and political 
causes more generally, beginning the recent history of campaign finance 
reform in which its supporters and opponents (the latter often including 
Congressional members) are continually engaged in a struggle to define and 
impose, and explore and expand the rules. Congress also established a 
presidential election system that limited the amount of money that 
presidential contenders who accept public financing for their campaigns can 
spend during the primaries and during the fall election stage.9 
Moreover, partly because of Nixon’s embrace of corporate money, 
new organizations arose that made the proper nature of the election process, 
that is to say efforts to curb the unjustified access to government circles by 
special corporate interests, their main issue. In 1970, for instance, Common 
                                                     
8 D. Eggen, ‘Post-Watergate Campaign Finance Limits Undercut by Changes’, The 
Washington Post, June 17, 2012.  
9 Barack Obama was the first presidential candidate who decided to opt out of this 
system in 2008, well aware that he could raise more money on the basis of private 
contributions than the public system would allow him to spend. 




Cause was established. Originally created by a Republican politician 
involved in demonstrations against the Vietnam War, Common Cause aims 
to improve the quality of American democracy by focusing on its blemishes. 
As its website states, Common Cause  
 
is a nonpartisan, nonprofit advocacy organization founded in 1970 
by John Gardner as a vehicle for citizens to make their voices heard 
in the political process and to hold their elected leaders accountable 
to the public interest.10  
 
It wants to return politics to the public by restoring the ‘good government’ 
tradition that was part of earlier reform movements in American political 
history such as the Progressive Era (broadly the years of the Theodore 
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson presidencies), aiming to professionalize 
and democratize politics by taking it out of the hands of a select and limited 
number of particularly corporate interest groups and allowing every citizen 
equal access to government institutions and representatives. Common 
Cause helped change campaign finance rules on the federal and state levels, 
and stood at the origin of innovations such as the Freedom of Information 
Act (originally enacted under President Lyndon B Johnson but expanded 
under President Gerald Ford in 1974 due to the Watergate scandal), which 
forced the United States government to ensure ‘public access to U.S. 
government records.’11  
Common Cause is part of a far larger history of similar organizations 
that includes its early-twentieth-century predecessor the Citizens Union and 
institutions such as the American Civil Liberties Union, created in 1920 to 
protect Americans’ civil rights, and Public Citizen. As its website states,  
 
Public Citizen serves as the people’s voice in the nation’s capital. 
Since our founding in 1971, we have delved into an array of areas, 
but our work on each issue shares an overarching goal: To ensure 
that all citizens are represented in the halls of power. 
 
The motto that the organization uses says: ‘Corporations have their 
lobbyists in Washington, D.C. The people need advocates too.’12  All of 
                                                     
10 Common Cause, ‘About Us’, http://www.commoncause.org/. 
11  The National Security Archive, ‘The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)’, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia.html. 
12 Public Citizen, ‘About Public Citizen’: http://www.citizen.org/. 




these public interest organizations are not just part of a good government 
tradition but also of what French scholar Pierre Rosanvallon has called 
‘counter-democracy’: public attempts to improve the quality of democratic 
politics that can be said to enhance democratic legitimacy from the bottom 
up by resorting to a tradition of distrust.13 
Public concerns are what differentiate this type of organizations 
from, say, the National Rifle Association, which defends the citizen’s right 
to carry arms, and special interest groups such as corporations: they claim to 
defend the public cause instead of specific interests. As the names reveal, 
Common Cause and others like it try to limit what can be called a 
privatization of politics. Though embracing the free market system, they 
aim to uphold the government’s impartial, regulatory role and the quality of 
the public domain. To a certain extent they subscribe to the old, eighteenth-
century republican (or civic-humanist) tradition that Barack Obama also 
approves of: considering the public interest to be more important than the 
private, they worry about the intrusion of the private into the public.14  
In a recent New York Times article about the New Jersey prison 
system, the newspaper reported about halfway house facilities created to 
prepare prisoners for re-entry in society.15 The article details the defects of 
the institutions managed, in this case, by private companies: the lack of 
oversight, the number of escapees who commit new crimes, the odd links 
between the state’s governor, Chris Christy, other New Jersey politicians, 
and the owners of the company running the halfway houses. The article is 
not only a complaint about these poorly run private organizations but also 
brings into the open the behind-the-scenes contacts between private 
investors and public officials that usually bring about these organizations 
and deals. Privatizing politics in certain ways is what Common Cause 
opposes. Even if not necessarily against the presence of market forces in 
public affairs, Common Cause assesses private contributions to the public 
                                                     
13  P. Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust, trans. by A. 
Goldhammer (Cambridge, U.K. 2008) ‘Introduction’. 
14 Bernard Bailyn’s The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass. 
1967) is one of the standard works on the republican or civic humanist tradition. J. 
T. Kloppenberg, Reading Obama: Dreams, Hope, and the American Political Tradition 
(Princeton 2011) discusses Obama against the backdrop of the republican paradigm; 
see particularly 43-44, 101-102. 
15 S. Dolnick, ‘Unlocked. Inside New Jersey’s Halfway Houses: As Escapees Stream 
Out, A Penal Business Thrives’, The New York Times, 16 June, 2012. 




domain on the basis of their public value; moreover, it wants agreements 
about these contributions to be the result of open, transparent, that is to say 
public deliberations. 
  
Yet while the goals of public interest organizations such as Common Cause 
differ from the ones whose influence they try to expose and limit, they are 
oddly linked to the very groups they oppose. Altough these organizations 
correctly claim to differ from ‘regular’ special interest lobby groups in that 
they aim for transparency and fairness in the political process, the methods 
on which organizations such as Common Cause rely are not completely 
different from the features ascribed to regular lobbyists. Common Cause 
too hopes to influence the government; its representatives try to persuade 
politicians to support its crusade, most probably also seeking them out in 
the effort. Even though it claims to represent the public good and 
characterizes its work as advocacy more than lobbying, it ‘lobbies’ 
government agencies and Congress to achieve its aims. Public Citizen’s 
website mentions that it ‘has two offices in Washington, D.C., and one in 
Austin, Texas.’16 Ironically, forcing politicians and the government to be the 
agent of more than a happy few, organizations such as Common Cause and 
Public Citizen try to restrict – or perhaps even end – all lobbying by 
embracing strategies at least partly copied from their opponents: though 
trying to push the government to embrace the public cause, they are 
engaged in what can well be considered as lobbying. Can lobbying still be 
denounced as a threat to democracy if even those opposing lobbying rely on 
its very means: what does it say that even the opponents of lobbying have 
to resort to lobbying to achieve their aims? 
While Common Cause differentiates its lobbying efforts from the 
attempts to influence government officials instigated by representatives of 
other, more privately oriented lobby organizations by claiming to fight for 
all Americans, such claims are difficult to sustain in so large a democracy as 
the American. The ‘public good’ is notoriously difficult to define – as is the 
claim of ‘undue influence’ leveled at lobbyists. If even those who complain 
about the undue influence exerted by special interest groups over 
government policies are forced to organize and lobby, are lobbies and 
lobbying all we have, resembling the factions that James Madison bewailed 
yet could not do without? Indeed, Madison acknowledged that it would be 
                                                     
16 Public Citizen, ‘About Public Citizen’. 




foolish to try and abolish them. He explained why on the basis of a 
comparison involving the relationship between air and fire:  
 
Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it 
instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, 
which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it 
would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal 
life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.17 
 
While access to government circles is what everyone wants and is entitled to 
in a democracy, no one automatically gets the politicians’ ear. To expedite 
this access some form of ‘lobbying’ is necessary, as even the opponents of 
lobbying show. A voice has to be heard and registered before politicians 
and officials are even willing to listen; it makes sense to get organized for 
the purpose, increasing the number of people sharing one’s political desires, 
and advance this process through lobbying. In the democratic efforts to 
gain access to government circles lobbying is a necessary, almost inherent 
aspect of the political process, particularly given the number of interests 
making up a society. Interest groups will vary depending on the scope of 
their concerns: whereas some have a rather restricted clientele, others 
pretend to represent an issue of public wellbeing – many of them will 
actually pretend to be part of the latter category. Regardless of the more or 
less restricted nature of the interest group involved, everyone tries to gain 
access to politicians in the effort to sway them and realize specific desires. 
In a democracy, everyone is a closet lobbyist.  
 
Inez Schippers’ contribution shows how Christian groups in the United 
States were provoked to lobby in favor of their religious tradition when 
their convictions and values were apparently no longer adhered to in the 
public domain. As Johanna Kardux’ essay on the African-American burial 
ground in New York City shows, without the support of various African 
American politicians in the city, state, and national governments whose 
assistance was sought by protestors concerned about their African-
American ancestors’ remains not much would have happened. The 
differences between lobbying to promote rather material private interests 
and advocating public policies are not always clear. Many efforts at gaining 
influence can be considered, and involve, lobbying.  
                                                     
17 J. Madison, ‘The Federalist No. 10’, 161. 




Government agencies also lobby government agencies. But, as Mark 
Miller’s article indicates, the weapon of lobbying assumes a different shape 
in the hands of the president of the United States, who, trying to enhance 
his political impact, will do his utmost to prevent the Supreme Court from 
blocking his political agenda; he will for instance ‘lobby’ to get his nominees 
for the court appointed. Political parties can ‘lobby’ the moment they find 
that the voices and visions they stand for are ignored. More importantly, 
they will do so openly, via the press and other means. Sabrina Otterloo’s 
contribution narrates how after the American Civil War Louisiana 
Democrats engaged in a campaign intended to sway white voters of the 
need to purge Louisiana politics of African-Americans. Though on the one 
hand the opposite of lobbying in its blatant negation of the behind-the-
scenes strategies of ‘persuasion’ that characterize the phenomenon, the 
violence on which the Democratic party in the state relied can on the other 
hand be described, to paraphrase William James, as the immoral equivalent 
of lobbying, that is to say its most brazen form.18  
One of the intriguing questions that Mark de Vries’ essay about the 
neoconservative intellectuals who transformed the Republican Party under 
presidents Reagan and George H. W. and George W. Bush raises, is to what 
extent intellectuals writing public opinion pieces are engaged in a lobbying 
effort that is not immediately recognized as such because of its public and 
open nature. In this respect, government itself is the site of lobbying in 
more than one respect. Far from representing a blank sheet, or neutral 
space, upon which lobbyists try to impose or imprint their desires, 
government is the result of lobbying efforts; moreover, it not only 
continually undergoes but also exerts efforts to shape official policies. While 
even a narrow reading of lobbying shows it to be an all-pervasive tool 
difficult to distinguish from other stratagems of political persuasion, in its 
expansive definition all democratic government is lobbying. 
Consequently, as scholars of lobbying indicate, efforts to curb the 
activities of lobbyists have to be addressed carefully because they may strike 
at democracy’s heart. Constitutional scholars will point out that what one 
could call the right to lobby is guaranteed by the first amendment of the 
American constitution, which refers not only to the freedom of religion and 
press but also the right to petition government: in a perhaps rather broad 
interpretation of the text of the constitution, scholars associate this right 
                                                     
18 W. James, ‘The Moral Equivalent of War’ (1910) in: W. James, Writings 1902-1910 
(New York 1987) 1281-1293. 




with lobbying.19 Organizations such as Common Cause that helped enact a 
series of regulations covering the activities of lobbyists have to tread 
carefully. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 forces lobbyists for trade 
groups to register. Later amendments refined the rules even further, 
influencing the position of those sought out by lobbyists. Nowadays, 
members of Congress are forced to make public the gifts they receive and 
the trips they make, detailing the purpose of travel and how it is financed. 
In a somewhat similar but less formal vein, websites such as 
Opensecrets.org keep track of the amount of money lobbyists spend and 
the number of former lobbyists working in Congress. Efforts to make sure 
that after the Citizens United decision by the Supreme Court in 2010 the 
public gets to know who sponsors the political campaign advertisements 
financed by the so-called ‘super Pacs’ (political action committees) and 
other related organizations not required by law to divulge the names of their 
contributors are part of the same movement to expose the work of lobbying 
and influence peddling. The court’s Citizens United decision undermined 
the McCain-Feingold Act of 2002, which updated the 1972 FECA, in that it 
allowed corporations and labor unions to spend unlimited amounts of 
money on political causes and election campaigns, provided this spending 
was not directly related to the campaign of specific political candidates. But 
the new rules do not prevent members of Congress from becoming 
lobbyists after their years in the House and Senate, or lobbyists from 
becoming their staff members because such regulations would impinge on 
individual liberties. Far from halting the amount of lobbying, the 1995 act 
aimed to regulate the process. It simply ensured that the status and behavior 
of the approximately 12.000 lobbyists who are active in Washington, D.C., 
have to meet official requirements. 
Opponents of this type of regulation can rest assured: its effects are 
small. Even Common Cause’s efforts to undo lobbying by undermining one 
of its main pillars, secrecy, have met with limited success. Legislation such 
as the Lobbying Act intends to bring into the open what lobbyists try to 
hide from view, robbing them of one of their most potent weapons: the 
hidden nature of their activities. The idea behind campaigns that aim to 
bring lobbying into the open is that openness will undo the lobbyists’ 
                                                     
19 The text of the amendment reads: ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.’ 




influence: interestingly, whereas in the debate about a thriving public 
domain there is a solid group of thinkers who believe that face-to-face 
meetings are essential to bring about a healthy public sphere, in the debate 
about lobbying these very same face-to-face meetings are considered the 
heart of the problem. It is questionable, however, if this openness can be 
achieved and has the desired effect. In the White House all presidential 
visitors are registered upon entry; should members of Congress be forced to 
list all the people they meet? More importantly, the open nature of public-
minded lobbyists’ efforts and the desire for fairness do not automatically 
turn institutions such as Common Cause into non-lobbying organizations. 
Even those ‘lobbyists’ whose major strength consists of their access to 
publicity and the open nature of their efforts cannot fully transcend the 
problematic features of lobbying.  
If openness about contacts undermines the illicit nature of lobbying, 
intellectuals are the ideal lobbyists. But as Mark de Vries’s essay shows, this 
idyllic picture of intellectual lobbyists only partly holds. While the neo-
conservative redefinition of American foreign policy that helped bring 
about a conservative, Republican take-over in American politics may have 
occurred quite openly, this public, ‘rational’ lobbying effort in favor of 
Republican policies and politicians was part of a far more insidious and 
secret revolution that made a mockery of democracy: the intellectuals’ 
openness, their publicity and purportedly civic contribution to public 
discussions, did not fit into the tradition of the public sphere glorified by 
the likes of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas – a sphere grounded in 
open, rational debate – but served mainly to re-establish the kind of secret 
access to government and administration officials that organizations such as 
Common Cause aimed to question and eliminate.20 
When even openness does not necessarily undo lobbyists’ efforts, 
opponents of lobbying are hardly helpless, however. They can resort to 
similar tactics, trying to influence public opinion with public statements 
making their case. Moreover, they will simply have to step up the hard work 
of unmasking lobbying by exposing the links between government officials 
and politicians on the one hand and lobbyists on the other in an approach 
                                                     
20 Jürgen Habermas is credited with reigniting the debate about the public sphere in 
for instance the United States due to the English translation of his early work on 
the subject titled The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, Mass. 1989). Ideally the sphere is 
characterized by rational public debate. 




of relentless distrust that is at once conducive to, and essential for, 
democracy and damaging in its disclosures. 
 
Lobbying is thus an inherent part of American politics, in which even the 
most public-minded citizens have to engage if they wish to succeed in 
blocking their opponents’ privileged position. Everyone has to ‘lobby’ to 
make sure that no political perspective is disregarded. As the following 
essays indicate, lobbying takes on different hues, depending on the cause it 
represents and the parties involved. Even though most groups engaged in 
defending their special interests claim the mantle of ‘public interest’, it is 
relatively easy to distinguish the most blatant forms of private interest 
lobbying from the campaigns of organizations such as Common Cause. To 
reveal these lobbying efforts will not automatically stop them, however. As 
many political commentators would add, stopping these efforts is not even 
necessary. Lobbying is as much part of democratic politics as the power 
struggles between different branches of government and the rivalries of 
other political players and institutions. While clamoring for openness, even 
those who lobby to end all lobbying will use special channels of access to 
ensure the success of their efforts. Lobbying is simply one of the 
professional aspects of doing American politics.  
While the least democratic lobbying campaigns occur in the dark 
(their representatives well aware that their desires are ‘special’ and not 
exactly representative of the public good), the most democratic appear in 
the open, simply claiming a seat at the negotiating table in a play of interest 
groups politics that will give each player his or her due. As Laura Maessen’s 
contribution to this issue of Leidschrift shows, the Mississippi Freedom 
Democratic Party that challenged the Mississippi Democratic Party’s 
delegate selection for the 1964 Democratic presidential convention is a 
prime example of this kind of lobbying. Excluded from the election process 
by the racist and segregationist forces in Mississippi politics, the 
representatives of the movement fought hard to democratize politics by 
turning at least the Democratic Party’s presidential election process into a 
fair deal. That their efforts to open up the procedures involved among other 
things intricate behind-the-scenes maneuvering indicates how convoluted 
even the most lofty campaigns for a more participatory democracy are.  
 
Many citizens lobby, either to protect their material interests or to preserve 
their heritage and ensure the introduction of their religious convictions into 




the political domain. Many of them resort to publicity to prove how rational 
and reasonable their claims are. And if even the most Protestant Americans 
are engaged in lobbying efforts to have their voices heard and convictions 
registered, perhaps the distrust of lobbying that is so pervasive in circles 
claiming to represent the public good has to be re-evaluated. Without these 
influence-peddling efforts political voices remain mute and desires 
unfulfilled; without the attempts to get government officials and politicians 
to listen to one’s demands, there is no democracy. Paradoxically, only 
lobbying can undo lobbying. Like James Madison’s factions, which enable 
and divide politics, lobbying is a two-edged sword, at once a curse and a 
blessing. While the distrust aimed at lobbying and the suspicion that some 
may have better access to government officials and politicians than others 
represent a healthy attitude conducive to democracy, they also fuel the 
phenomenon they try to undermine.  
